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Abstract  
 
Regulation G requires all companies to quantitatively reconcile pro forma earnings with 
GAAP earnings. This paper provides three findings related to the impact of reconciliations on 
mispricing of pro forma earnings. First, prior to Reg G, we find that mis-pricing of pro forma 
earnings is limited to firms with low reconciliation quality. There is no evidence of mispricing 
for firms with high reconciliation quality. Second, we find no evidence of mispricing after 
Reg G. Third, there is a cross-Reg G reduction of mispricing for firms whose reconciliation 
quality improves, and there continues to be no-mispricing for firms that have high 
reconciliation quality both before and after Reg G. Together, our results support the notion 
that better reconciliations reduce the extent of mispricing. 
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1. Introduction 
Pro forma earnings are a popular form of voluntary disclosure. According to a Wall 
Street Journal article (August 21, 2001, p. 1), in the second quarter of 2001, 300 of the S&P 
500 companies reported pro forma earnings. One salient characteristic of pro forma earnings 
is that managers have considerable discretion in deciding which GAAP items to exclude. As a 
result, different companies compute pro forma earnings differently and, for the same firm, 
items excluded from pro forma earnings can change over time. 
The considerable discretion that managers have over the definition of pro forma 
earnings is worrisome to security regulators. Noting that non-GAAP information has “no 
defined meaning and no uniform characteristics,” the SEC issued a warning in December 
2001, cautioning public companies not to mislead investors (SEC, 2001). On January 16, 
2002, Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts Inc. was charged by the SEC for misleading investors 
because its pro forma earnings included special gains but excluded special losses (SEC, 
2002a).  On January 22, 2003, the SEC finalized Reg G to regulate the disclosures of pro 
forma earnings. Effective on March 28, 2003, Reg G stipulates that disclosures containing pro 
forma earnings must provide the most directly comparable GAAP number and a clearly 
understandable quantitative reconciliation of the two earnings numbers. The SEC argued in its 
final ruling statement that “the reconciliation will provide the securities markets with 
additional information to more accurately evaluate companies' securities and, in turn, result in 
a more accurate pricing of securities” (SEC, 2002b).  
Previous empirical research using data prior to Reg G finds that the higher the pro 
forma earnings relative to GAAP earnings, the lower the future returns (Doyle et al., 2003; 
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Lougee and Marquardt, 2004). This evidence is consistent with investors being misled by pro 
forma disclosures. It is not clear, however, whether reconciliations result in more accurate 
pricing of securities, as the SEC conjectured. If better reconciliations provide investors with 
more information about pro forma adjustments, investors are likely to be better informed, 
which increases the chance that stocks are priced correctly. However, if the information 
contained in reconciliations can be obtained elsewhere, for example, if it can be inferred from 
the income statement, reconciliations will not affect securities pricing as they essentially 
contain no incremental information. Further, if firms are strategic in their reconciliation 
decisions and investors are not aware of this, reconciliations may even exacerbate the extent 
of mispricing. Thus, whether reconciliations result in more accurate pricing of securities is an 
empirical issue, which we investigate in this paper.   
To examine this issue, we conduct three separate but related tests. First, we investigate 
whether there is less mispricing of pro forma earnings for firms with high reconciliation 
quality in the period prior to Reg G.  At this time, there was substantial variation in 
reconciliation quality due to the lack of relevant regulation. Affirmative evidence would be 
consistent with the notion that high quality reconciliations help to reduce the mispricing of 
pro forma earnings. In our analysis, we control for a host of variables that affect firms’ 
reconciliation quality to alleviate the concern that reconciliation quality proxies for those 
variables.  
Second, given that Reg G mandates a high level of reconciliation quality, we 
triangulate the results from the first test by examining whether pro forma earnings are 
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mispriced after Reg G. Our results also serve as direct evidence on the effectiveness of Reg G 
in curbing the mispricing associated with pro forma earnings.  
Third, we apply a difference-in-difference approach to investigate whether mispricing 
is reduced after the improvement in reconciliation quality.1 Specifically, we compare changes 
in the extent of mispricing for two types of firms: firms with low reconciliation quality prior 
to Reg G but high reconciliation quality after Reg G (improvers) and firms with consistently 
high reconciliation quality both before and after Reg G (non-improvers). If reconciliations 
reduce mispricing, we expect a significant reduction in the extent of mispricing for improvers 
but not for non-improvers.  
Results from all three tests support the notion that reconciliations reduce mispricing of 
pro forma earnings. In particular, prior to Reg G, we find that mispricing of pro forma 
earnings exists only in firms with low reconciliation quality and there is no evidence of 
mispricing for firms with high reconciliation quality. After Reg G, no evidence of mispricing 
is found. Across Reg G, there is a reduction of mispricing for firms that improve 
reconciliation quality, but there continues to be no mispricing for firms that consistently have 
high reconciliation quality. Together, our results support the SEC's claim that better 
reconciliations result in more accurate pricing of securities. We further investigate whether 
changes in the quality of items excluded from pro forma earnings explain our results, and we 
find no evidence supporting this alternative explanation. 
Our paper contributes to the literature on pro forma disclosures. Several papers 
investigate investors’ possible mispricing of pro forma earnings, and their findings are 
generally consistent with pro forma earnings being mispriced. In an experimental setting, 
                                                 
1 Throughout the paper, the term “mispricing” refers to mispricing associated with pro forma earnings. 
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Frederickson and Miller (2004) find that less sophisticated investors value the firm higher 
when it reports a higher pro forma earnings measure in addition to GAAP earnings than when 
it reports GAAP earnings only.  Doyle et al. (2003) use actual earnings reported by I/B/E/S as 
proxies for pro forma earnings and find that, consistent with pro forma earnings being 
mispriced, the higher the I/B/E/S earnings relative to GAAP earnings, the lower the future 
returns. Lougee and Marquardt (2004) manually collect pro forma earnings data and report 
evidence of mispricing when the informativeness of GAAP earnings is high and when GAAP 
earnings surprises are negative. We provide evidence that better reconciliation quality reduces 
mispricing of pro forma earnings. Specifically, we show that mispricing documented by the 
prior literature exists only among firms with low reconciliation quality but not among firms 
with high reconciliation quality. Our empirical evidence has implications for how to alleviate 
mispricing of pro forma earnings, which is of great importance to researchers, investors and 
securities regulators.  
Our paper also contributes to the growing literature on the impact of SEC regulations 
on pro forma disclosures. Marques (2006) finds that after Reg G, the probability of pro forma 
earnings disclosures declines and investors react more positively to such disclosures.  Kolev 
et al. (2008) document that items excluded from pro forma earnings are more transitory after 
Reg G. They also find that firms that stopped releasing non-GAAP earnings numbers after 
Reg G have lower quality exclusions prior to Reg G. Yi (2007) presents evidence that firms 
with communication motives (opportunistic motives) are more (less) likely to continue 
disclosing pro forma earnings in the post-Reg G period. Heflin and Hsu (2008) find that Reg 
G reduces the frequency of non-GAAP earnings disclosures, the magnitude of amounts 
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excluded from GAAP earnings, and the association between returns and forecast errors. 
Although these studies address important research questions, they do not address whether Reg 
G achieves its stated purpose of reducing the extent of mispricing. We contribute to this line 
of literature on pro forma disclosures by filling this void. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our measures of 
mispricing and reconciliation quality. Sections 3 and 4 present the pre-Reg G analysis and the 
post-Reg G analysis, respectively. Section 5 considers an alternative explanation for our 
results, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Measures of mispricing and reconciliation quality 
This section discusses our measures of mispricing and reconciliation quality. We first 
discuss how we measure the extent of mispricing.  
If investors misprice pro forma earnings, the information contained in pro forma 
earnings will be systematically correlated with future abnormal returns. Doyle et al. (2003) 
document that excluded expenses, defined as pro forma earnings minus GAAP earnings, are 
negatively correlated with future abnormal returns, consistent with investors being misled by 
pro forma disclosures. Following Doyle et al. (2003), we measure the extent of mispricing 
using the returns from an arbitrage portfolio, which has a long (short) position in firms with 
low (high) excluded expenses. If the market misprices pro forma earnings, the return to such 
an arbitrage portfolio will be significantly positive.  
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We next discuss how we measure reconciliation quality. We quantify reconciliation 
quality according to the table below with better reconciliation quality represented by a higher 
score.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the above table illustrates, if an earnings release does not provide any 
reconciliation information, the reconciliation quality variable takes a value of zero. If the 
earnings release provides the names of the accounts that account for the difference between 
the GAAP and pro forma earnings numbers but it does not also specify their magnitudes, then 
the reconciliation quality variable equals one. If, in addition, the release specifies the 
magnitudes, then this variable takes the value two. Although the magnitude is mentioned, the 
information provided may not completely explain the difference between pro forma and 
GAAP earnings. If the earnings release contains both a pro forma income statement and a 
GAAP income statement, the reconciliation quality variable equals three. Finally, if the 
earnings release explicitly provides a table that reconciles the GAAP earnings with the pro 
forma earnings, the reconciliation quality variable takes the value four, the highest score.  
Reconciliations between GAAP earnings and 
pro forma earnings 
Reconciliation 
score 
Ordinal measure 
of quality 
No disclosure of the account names or magnitudes 0      Lowest level 
Disclosure of the account names only 1 
 
Disclosure of both the account names and 
magnitudes 2 
 
Disclosure of both the GAAP and pro forma 
income statements 3 
 
Disclosure of a reconciliation table between GAAP 
and pro forma earnings 4 Highest level 
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We note that the earnings release fully articulates the difference between GAAP and 
pro forma earnings when the disclosure quality score is either three or four. However, we 
choose to make a distinction between these two forms of disclosure because behavioral 
studies suggest that the format in which the information is presented affects investors’ 
judgments (e.g., Elliott, 2006). A reconciliation score of four indicates that it is easier for 
investors to make a direct comparison between pro forma earnings and GAAP earnings, 
compared with the score of three. Appendix A provides examples of different reconciliation 
quality scores.2  
 
3.   Pre-Reg G analysis 
 
 To examine whether better reconciliations mitigate mispricing associated with pro 
forma disclosures, we use data prior to Reg G, a period when there is meaningful cross-
sectional variation in reconciliation quality due to the lack of relevant regulations. As 
reconciliation quality is at the discretion of management prior to Reg G, many factors may 
affect firms’ reconciliation decisions. For example, firms with more institutional holdings 
may provide higher quality reconciliations in response to demands from institutional investors. 
This raises the concern that the relationship between mispricing and observed reconciliation 
quality may be driven by those underlying factors.  
                                                 
2 Some complexities arise in the coding process. For example, if the difference between GAAP and pro forma 
earnings concerns only one account and the account name is mentioned, we code it not as one, but as two, 
because the magnitude can be easily inferred by comparing the two earnings numbers. However, such 
observations account for only a small proportion of our sample (1.5%), and eliminating them does not have any 
effect on our results.   
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To alleviate this concern, we use a measure of reconciliation quality after controlling 
for its determinants. Specifically, we build a model that explains reconciliation quality, and 
the residual from this model, i.e., the residual reconciliation quality, is the measure we use. 
We investigate whether there is less mispricing for firms with high residual reconciliation 
quality. Affirmative evidence would support the notion that better reconciliations mitigate the 
mispricing of pro forma earnings.  
 
3.1  The determinants of reconciliation quality 
 In identifying the determinants of reconciliation quality, we borrow largely from the 
literature on voluntary disclosures and recent studies on pro forma disclosures. Prior literature 
finds that voluntary disclosures are affected by the value-relevance of GAAP earnings (Chen 
et al., 2002; Tasker, 1998; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Lennox and Park, 2006), managerial 
incentives (Schrand and Walther, 2000; Lougee and Marquardt, 2004; Bowen et al., 2005), 
and investor sophistication (Bowen et al., 2005). To the extent that reconciliations prior to 
Reg G are voluntary, we expect those factors to be correlated with reconciliation quality. We 
also expect reconciliation quality to be affected by the characteristics of pro forma 
adjustments, such as the type, the magnitude, and the total number of items excluded from pro 
forma earnings.  
To summarize, our model is specified as follows:  
LOGRECONCILE =  α0+ α1 PRLOSS + α2 STDROA + α3 HITECH + α4 LOSS 
 + α5 EMPHASIS + α6REVERSELOSS+ α7REVERSEMIS+ α8NUMEST 
 + α9INSTOWN+ α10LOGASSETS+ α11ABSDIFF+ α12LOGTOTALNUM 
 +Σ δk TYPE(k) + ε                                     (1)
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where 
 
LOGRECONCILE is the logged value of one plus the raw reconciliation quality score. 
PRLOSS (the frequency of prior losses), STDROA (earnings variability), HITECH 
(membership in a high-tech industry), and LOSS (current losses) are four measures of 
the value-relevance of GAAP earnings. Higher value of the four variables indicates 
lower value-relevance which, according to prior literature, predicts a higher quality of 
reconciliations. Thus the predicted sign is positive on the four variables. 
EMPHASIS, REVERSELOSS and REVERSEMIS are proxies for managerial incentives to 
emphasize pro forma earnings, report positive earnings and beat analysts’ forecasts, 
respectively. On one hand, managerial strategic incentives may lead to low quality of 
reconciliations in an attempt to avoid scrutiny from investors. On the other hand, 
managers may provide high quality of reconciliations to convince investors of the 
superiority of pro forma numbers as a performance measure. We thus do not have any 
prediction on the sign on the three variables.  
NUMEST (the number of analysts that follow the firm) and INSTOWN (the percentage 
ownership of institutional investors) are proxies for investor sophistication. Prior 
literature provides evidence that managers provide more voluntary disclosures when 
faced with pressures from institutional investors. Thus we predict a positive sign on 
the two variables.  
LOGASSETS is the natural log of total assets. Bigger firms are under more scrutiny from 
 investors and the media and they are more likely to provide higher quality of 
 reconciliations. The predicted sign is positive. 
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ABSDIFF is the absolute value of pro forma earnings per share minus GAAP earnings per 
share deflated by total assets per share. A greater deviation of pro forma earnings 
from GAAP earnings warrants more detailed explanations. Thus, we predict a 
positive sign. 
LOGTOTALNUM is the natural log of the total number of adjustments between GAAP 
earnings and pro forma earnings. We predict a positive sign because investors may 
demand higher quality of reconciliations when there are many pro forma adjustments.  
TYPE (k) refers to the dummies representing eleven types of pro forma adjustment.3 
Appendix B provides detailed definitions for each variable. We include the types of 
adjustment as they may also affect the firm’s reconciliation decision.   
 
 
 
3.2 Sample formation  and descriptive statistics 
  We manually collect the press releases related to pro forma earnings. Following 
Bhattacharya et al. (2003) and Lougee and Marquardt (2004), we search PR Newswire and 
Business Wire4 in the Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe database using the following keywords: 
“pro forma,” “proforma,” or “pro-forma.”5  Similar to Lougee and Marquardt (2004), we 
                                                 
3 Bhattacharya et al. (2003) classify pro forma adjustments into eight types. We augment their classification by 
including three additional types: INTANGAMORT, RESTRUCT, and IMPAIR, which represent, respectively, pro 
forma adjustments related to amortization of intangibles and goodwill, restructuring charges, and write-offs due 
to asset impairment.  
4 Firms have many channels through which they may communicate with financial analysts and the public. Thus, 
to the extent that firms may issue reconciliations through channels other than press releases, our results may 
suffer from selection bias. However, it is not clear that this bias would have a large effect on our results. For 
instance, if firms use the same reconciliation approach across the various channels, this concern is unlikely to 
affect our results. 
5 While some companies use terms other than ‘‘pro forma,’’ ‘‘pro-forma,’’ or ‘‘proforma’’ to describe their non-
GAAP earnings metrics (Bradshaw, 2003), we adopt this particular search string for three reasons. First, we are 
unaware of any reason the use of “pro forma” as the search keyword would introduce a systematic bias into our 
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exclude those press releases in which: (a) the pro forma earnings data correspond to a quarter 
other than the current quarter; (b) the use of the term “pro forma” refers solely to the 
retroactive effect of an initial public offering, merger, or acquisition; or (c) the use of pro 
forma earnings reflects a change in tax status, capital structure, or accounting method. In 
addition, we require non-missing CUSIP and PERMNO information, and we require that the 
earnings announcement date in Compustat match our press release date. 
In December 2001, the SEC cautioned public companies not to mislead investors 
when providing non-GAAP information. Given that public firms were aware of the SEC’s 
stance on pro forma earnings disclosures after the SEC’s warning, they could have reasonably 
anticipated and prepared for the issuance of Reg G. Accordingly, our pre-Reg G sample 
period is restricted to the period prior to the SEC’s warning.6 The final sample consists of 
2,934 press releases for 1,147 firms between January 1998 and December 2001.  
Figure 1 depicts the frequency distribution of the reconciliation quality score among 
the 2,934 pro forma press releases in our sample. With only a few exceptions (19 press 
releases, or 0.65% of the sample), almost all pro forma press releases provide some type of 
reconciliation between GAAP and pro forma earnings. In particular, 18% provide account 
names but no magnitudes, 32% reveal both the account names and magnitudes, 40% disclose 
both GAAP and pro forma income statements, and 9% provide a reconciliation table.  
                                                                                                                                                        
analysis. Second, searching with the keyword “pro forma” appears to be an efficient way to identify non-GAAP 
earnings releases, as “pro forma” is the most frequently used label in both the pre- and post-Reg G periods (Yi, 
2007). Third, from a practical standpoint, it would be prohibitively expensive and time-consuming to adopt more 
general search criteria. We attempt to gauge the impact of this sample limitation on our analysis by adopting 
more general search criteria from Wallace (2002) for 1999 and repeating our pre-Reg G analysis on this larger 
sample. We obtain similar results.  
6 Our results hold, however, when the pre-Reg G sample period is extended to December 2002.  
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Table 1 reports the frequency distribution and mean reconciliation score of the sample 
by year, exchange, and industry. Panel A shows that the number of pro forma press releases 
has increased steadily from 282 in 1998 to 1,623 in 2001. This increasing pattern is consistent 
with the previous literature (Bhattacharya et al., 2004). The mean reconciliation score ranges 
from 2.23 in 1998 to 2.48 in 2000. Panel B indicates that about 84% of the press releases are 
from firms listed on the NASDAQ exchange. The mean reconciliation score ranges from 2.38 
for NASDAQ firms to 2.64 for AMEX firms. Finally, Panel C shows that the industry 
distribution of our sample is similar to that of Lougee and Marquardt (2004), with a relatively 
high concentration in high-tech and intangible-intensive industries (our industry definitions 
follow Francis and Schipper (1999) and Collins et al. (1997)).  
Panel A of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the pro forma adjustment 
categories during the pre-Reg G period. The most common adjustment is INTANGAMORT 
(intangible amortization) with 46.3% of the press releases making this type of adjustment, 
while EXTRADISC (extraordinary items and discontinued operations) is the least popular, 
with only 5.1% of the press releases making this type of adjustment.   
Panel B provides descriptive statistics for the other variables. Consistent with the prior 
literature (e.g., Lougee and Marquardt, 2004), we find that there is a high concentration of 
high-tech firms. Specifically, the mean value of HITECH reveals that 63.1% of the press 
releases are related to firms in high-tech industries. We also find that firms are more likely to 
emphasize pro forma earnings relative to GAAP earnings. The mean value of EMPHASIS 
shows that 81.5% of the press releases emphasize pro forma earnings.7  
                                                 
7 About 18% of the sample emphasizes GAAP earnings despite also reporting pro forma earnings. Bowen et al. 
(2005) suggest that firms tend to emphasize the earnings metric that is more value-relevant and portrays more 
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3.3 The determinant model results 
To obtain the residual measure of reconciliation quality, we estimate the determinant 
model of reconciliation quality as specified in Section 3.1. Our final sample consists of 1,900 
pro forma press releases from 1998-2001 because we require all the variables in the 
determinant model to be non-missing. Table 3 reports the estimation results. The reported t-
statistics are based on standard errors clustered by firm and fiscal quarter to account for time-
series and cross-sectional dependence in the error terms. 
Consistent with our predictions, the coefficients on STDROA, HITECH, LOGASSETS 
and LOGTOTALNUM are positive and significant, indicating that firms tend to provide better 
reconciliations when GAAP earnings are volatile ,when they are in high-tech industries, when 
they are large in size and when pro forma adjustments involve many items. The positive 
coefficients on EMPHASIS and REVERSELOSS suggest that reconciliation quality is higher 
when pro forma earnings are emphasized in the press release and when pro forma adjustments 
turn GAAP losses into pro forma profits. The negative coefficient on LOSS is inconsistent 
with our prediction. A potential explanation is that loss firms are more opportunistic and 
therefore provide lower reconciliation quality. As for the specific types of pro forma 
adjustments, we find that reconciliation quality is positively related to intangible 
amortizations (INTANGAMORT), R&D, and assets impairment (IMPAIR), while negatively 
related to adjustments in stock compensation costs (STOCKCOMP), restructuring charges 
(RESTRUCT), unclassified other categories (OTHERS), and the number of shares used in 
computing pro forma earnings (SHARES). 
                                                                                                                                                        
favorable firm performance. Based upon their findings, it is likely that firms decide to emphasize GAAP 
earnings because investors perceive GAAP earnings as more value relevant or because GAAP earnings are 
higher than pro forma earnings. 
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3.4 Main results 
In this section, we provide evidence on the relation between mispricing and 
reconciliation quality.  
We first obtain the residual from the reconciliation quality equation as specified in 
Section 3.1. This residual variable essentially measures reconciliation quality after controlling 
for its various determinants. We then form two equal-sized groups. The high (low) group 
consists of observations with residual reconciliation quality values above (below) the median. 
For both groups, we form three terciles every month according to pro forma exclusions (DIFF) 
and construct an arbitrage portfolio by buying stocks in the low DIFF portfolio and shorting 
stocks in the high DIFF portfolio, with all portfolios being held for one year. 8 DIFF measures 
pro forma exclusions and is computed as pro forma earnings minus GAAP earnings deflated 
by total assets. 9  The abnormal returns of the arbitrage portfolios measure the extent of 
mispricing. If better reconciliations reduce mispricing, the abnormal return should be smaller 
for the arbitrage portfolio formed within the group that has high residual reconciliation quality.  
The abnormal returns of portfolios are estimated by running calendar-time three-factor 
regressions (Fama and French, 1993). Our regression model is as follows:  
tεthHMLtsSMB]ftRmtb[RaftRptR +++−+=−        (2) 
                                                 
8 We deal with delisting-related missing returns as follows: we assume that the return for the delisting month is 
equal to the monthly delisting return reported in the CRSP monthly event file, while the returns for the 
subsequent months are equal to the returns on the value-weighted index of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks. 
This treatment essentially assumes that the investment is liquidated after the delisting date and the proceeds are 
subsequently invested in a market portfolio.  
9 Following Doyle et al. (2003), we define GAAP earnings as earnings per share before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations, using either basic (data item #19) or diluted (data item #9) earnings figures, depending 
on whether pro forma earnings are reported on a basic or diluted basis. 
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where Rpt is the month-t equally weighted return of the portfolio of firms that is formed at the 
end of month t-1; Rmt is the return of the value-weighted index of NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ stocks in month t; Rft  is the one-month Treasury bill rate in month t; SMBt is the 
return on small firms minus the return on large firms in month t; and HMLt is the return on 
high book-to-market stocks minus the return on low book-to-market stocks in month t.  
Table 4 reports the three-factor regression results. The intercept term - commonly 
referred to as “alpha” - measures the abnormal monthly return after controlling for the three 
risk factors. Panel A reports the results for observations with low residual reconciliation 
quality. We find that the abnormal return is positive and significant for the low DIFF portfolio 
but is negative and significant for the high DIFF portfolio. This finding is consistent with the 
notion that high DIFF firms are over-valued and low DIFF firms are under-valued. The 
arbitrage portfolio with a long position in firms with low DIFF and a short position in firms 
with high DIFF yields a positive and significant alpha of 0.010, representing a monthly risk 
adjusted abnormal return of 1%. This evidence suggests that significant mispricing exists for 
firms with low residual reconciliation quality.  Panel B reports the results for observations 
with high residual reconciliation quality. None of the three portfolios have significant alphas, 
providing no evidence of mispricing for firms with high reconciliation quality. 
We conduct four robustness checks. First, we test whether our results are driven by 
observations in year 2001, which was an unusual year for high-tech firms as the internet 
bubble burst that year. Our results are qualitatively similar after we delete observations from 
2001. Second, we test whether our results are sensitive to the choice of number of portfolios. 
We find that our inferences are the same if we form two instead of three portfolios based on 
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DIFF. Third, we test whether our results are sensitive to the specification of the determinant 
model. Specifically, we build a simultaneous equation system, which allows for the possibility 
that the firm’s emphasis decision (i.e., the decision to emphasize GAAP or pro forma earnings) 
and the firm’ reconciliation decision are mutually dependent. Details of the simultaneous 
equation system are provided in Appendix C. We obtain similar results when we obtain the 
residual reconciliation quality from the simultaneous equation system. Fourth, to alleviate the 
concern that firms’ reconciliation quality is a proxy for their emphasis decisions, we replicate 
our analysis on the subsample that emphasizes pro forma earnings. Our results are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 4.  
In sum, our evidence suggests that mispricing of pro forma earnings, documented by 
prior literature, exists only among firms with low reconciliation quality but not among firms 
with high reconciliation quality. Our finding is consistent with the notion that high quality 
reconciliations alleviate mispricing.10  
 
4.   Post-Reg G analysis 
 
4.1 Methodology 
                                                 
10 We further investigate whether better reconciliations mitigate mispricing through financial analysts. Gu and 
Chen (2004) document that analysts frequently make adjustments to the pro forma earnings provided in press 
releases and that the items they include in 'Street' earnings have higher valuation multiples than those they 
exclude. If the reconciliation’s impact on mispricing is through analysts, we would expect that analysts make 
more informed decisions for firms with better reconciliations, and consequently the included (excluded) 
components would be more (less) predictive of future operating performance. This leads to the testable 
hypothesis that the difference in predictability of future operating performance between included and excluded 
components is less (more) pronounced for firms with low (high) reconciliation quality. Some of our empirical 
results support this prediction, but the inferences are sensitive to the measure of future operating performance. 
The results are available upon request.  
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      We conduct two tests involving data after Reg G. We first examine whether pro forma 
earnings are mispriced after Reg G. Given that Reg G requires high quality reconciliations, 
evidence of no mispricing after Reg G would be consistent with the results from the pre-Reg 
G analysis and would support the notion that reconciliations reduce mispricing of pro forma 
earnings. Second, we use a difference-in-difference approach. Specifically, we compare the 
changes in mispricing for firms that improve their reconciliation quality after Reg G 
(improvers) and firms that maintain the same level of reconciliation quality (non-improvers).  
The advantages of this difference-in-difference approach are twofold. First, we follow 
the same firm from the pre-Reg G period to the post-Reg G period, so any significant change 
in the extent of mispricing cannot be attributed to unobserved firm-specific characteristics. 
Second, while some factors potentially related to the extent of mispricing – such as the 
macroeconomic environment, accounting rules (e.g., SFAS 142) and investor confidence in 
accounting numbers – may change across Reg G, such changes are likely to have the same 
impact on improvers and non-improvers. Thus, if we observe a significant reduction in 
mispricing for improvers across Reg G but not for non-improvers, the reduction in mispricing 
for improvers must be attributed to the improvement in reconciliation quality rather than to 
any difference in these factors. Essentially, the second advantage of this approach is that non-
improvers serve as a control for improvers and effectively control for the many possible 
changes across Reg G. 
Firms are identified as non-improvers if the firm’s reconciliation score is consistently 
above two both before and after Reg G, while firms are identified as improvers if the firm’s 
reconciliation score is consistently above two after Reg G but not before Reg G. We argue 
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that there is a difference between the two highest-scoring reconciliation types (i.e., those with 
a reconciliation score above two) and the remaining types (i.e., those with a reconciliation 
score no greater than two). First, from an informational perspective, the scores of three and 
four indicate that the press release fully explains the difference between pro forma earnings 
and GAAP earnings. Second, the majority of firms deem that these two forms of disclosure 
satisfy the Reg G requirement, as about 97% of post-Reg G observations reconcile the two 
earnings numbers using one of these two approaches.11 
Within improvers and non-improvers, we form two equal-sized portfolios every month 
based on DIFF and construct an arbitrage portfolio by buying stocks in the low DIFF 
portfolio and shorting stocks in the high DIFF portfolio.12 The high (low) DIFF portfolio 
consists of stocks with DIFF higher (lower) than the median. Consistent with other tables in 
the paper, all portfolios are held for one year. 
To capture the across-Reg G change in mispricing, our factor regression model is 
specified as follows.13  
     tthHMLtsSMBftRmtRbdPOSTGaftRptR ε+++−++=− ][   (3) 
In the model above, POSTG is equal to 1 when month t is after Reg G took effect and 
0 otherwise. The intercept term, “a”, measures the average monthly abnormal returns in the 
time period prior to Reg G. The coefficient on POSTG, “d”, captures the change in the 
                                                 
11 Forty-five observations (3% of the sample) have a reconciliation score equal to two. Of these, thirty-seven 
cases involve just a single item adjustment. 
12 We form two instead of three portfolios each month, due to the reduced number of observations associated 
with non-improvers. 
13 We do not allow the factor loadings to change across Reg G for the following two reasons. First, there is no 
reason to expect them to change across Reg G. Second, this specification is consistent with a large body of asset 
pricing literature in which factor loadings are not allowed to vary over time (e.g., Loughran and Ritter, 1995; 
Carhart, 1997; Cooper et al., 2008). 
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abnormal returns from the pre-Reg G period to the post-Reg G period with a negative sign 
indicating a drop in the abnormal returns after Reg G. The sum of the two coefficients, “a+d”, 
measures the abnormal returns for the post-Reg G period.   
We run the above factor regression for low DIFF, high DIFF and arbitrage portfolios 
separately for improvers and non-improvers. If reconciliation quality reduces mispricing, we 
expect that the coefficient on POSTG is insignificant for the arbitrage portfolio formed within 
non-improvers but significantly negative for that formed within improvers. In addition, we 
expect that the coefficient on POSTG is significantly different between non-improvers and 
improvers. 
 
4.2 Main results 
Given that our analysis requires observations after Reg G, we collect 1,295 quarterly 
pro forma earnings announcements released between April 2003 and December 2004, a 
period during which Reg G was effective. These observations are pooled with the 2,934 pre-
Reg G observations as a first step to identify improvers and non-improvers. Requiring non-
missing abnormal returns and data for the pre- and post-Reg G periods results in a sample of 
1,189 firm-quarter observations, of which 300 observations are associated with 51 non-
improvers, and 889 observations pertain to 144 improvers.  
The results are reported in Tables 5 and 6. Table 5 reports the calendar-time Fama-
French three factor regression results for the 1,295 observations after Reg G.  We form 
terciles each month based on DIFF and report the regression results for three portfolios: the 
low DIFF tercile, the high DIFF tercile, and an arbitrage portfolio that is long in the low 
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DIFF tercile and short in the high DIFF tercile.  All three portfolios are held for one year. 
Consistent with our pre-Reg G analysis, our focus is on the intercept term associated with the 
arbitrage portfolio, as this measures the extent of mispricing. We find that the intercept term is 
insignificant. This evidence suggests that there is no mispricing of DIFF in the post-Reg G 
period.  
Table 6 reports the results based on the difference-in-difference approach. Panels A 
and B report the calendar-time Fama-French three-factor regression results for  non-improvers 
and improvers, respectively. For non-improvers, the results show that neither low nor high 
DIFF portfolios exhibit significant abnormal returns prior to Reg G. The coefficient on 
POSTG reveals that there is no significant change in the abnormal return after Reg G for both 
portfolios. The same is true for the arbitrage portfolio. Our results thus suggest that there is no 
change in the extent of mispricing across Reg G for firms that consistently have high 
reconciliation quality.     
For improvers, results show that prior to Reg G, firms with high DIFF exhibit 
negative abnormal returns. This finding is consistent with the notion that those firms are over-
priced when pro forma earnings are disclosed and the subsequent correction leads to negative 
abnormal returns. The arbitrage portfolio exhibits positive and significant monthly abnormal 
returns of 1.8% prior to Reg G. The coefficient on POSTG is negative and significant at the 
5% level, suggesting that there is a significant cross-Reg G reduction in the mispricing of pro 
forma earnings for improvers.  
In the row immediately below Panel B, we report the p-value associated with testing 
whether for arbitrage portfolios, the coefficient on POSTG is significantly different between 
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improvers and non-improvers.14 Our two-sided t-test yields a p-value of 0.06, suggesting that 
the across-Reg G change in the extent of mispricing is significantly different across improvers 
and non-improvers.  
Finally, we test whether after Reg G, the arbitrage portfolio yields significant 
abnormal returns for both improvers and non-improvers. The p-values are 0.55 and 0.28, 
respectively, suggesting that there is no evidence of mispricing after Reg G. This finding is 
consistent with the results in Table 5. 
In sum, the evidence presented in Table 6 suggests that there is a significant reduction 
in mispricing for firms whose reconciliation quality improves, but there continues to be no 
mispricing for firms whose reconciliation quality is consistently high both before and after 
Reg G. Our evidence is consistent with the notion that better reconciliations reduce the extent 
of mispricing. To the extent that Reg G requires more informative reconciliations, our 
evidence suggests that Reg G has helped to curb the mispricing associated with pro forma 
earnings. 
 
5.  Alternative explanations 
In a related paper, Kolev et al. (2008) document a significant change in the quality of 
the items excluded from pro forma earnings after Reg G. Their study raises the possibility that 
                                                 
14 Specifically, we introduce a dummy, IMPROVE, which is equal to 1 for arbitrage portfolios formed within 
improvers and 0 for arbitrage portfolios formed within non-improvers, and interact this variable with all 
variables (including the intercept term) in the factor regression specified above. This is to allow all coefficients 
to vary between improvers and non-improvers. If the across-Reg G change in the extent of mispricing is 
significantly different across improvers and non-improvers, we expect the coefficient on the interaction term, 
IMPROVE*POSTG, to be significantly different from zero.  
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our results are explained by changes in the quality of excluded items instead of changes in the 
quality of reconciliations per se.  
To address this concern we examine whether the quality of excluded items and 
reconciliation quality are correlated. Following Kolev et al. (2008), we measure the quality of 
excluded items by their ability to predict future operating income. Specifically, in the analysis 
related to our pre-Reg G sample, we model future operating income (FOI), defined as 
operating income per share accumulated over the four quarters following the current quarter, 
as a linear function of pro forma EPS, DIFF, REC DUM, and the interaction between REC 
DUM and DIFF.15 REC DUM is coded as one if the reconciliation is of low quality (i.e., 
residual reconciliation quality is below the median), and zero otherwise. Kolev et al. (2008) 
document that future operating income is positively related to pro forma EPS and negatively 
related to pro forma excluded items. We therefore predict that the coefficient on pro forma 
EPS is positive and the coefficient on DIFF is negative. Our focus is however on the 
interaction term: REC DUM*DIFF. An insignificant coefficient indicates that there is no 
significant difference in the quality of excluded items between firms with high residual 
reconciliation quality and those with low residual reconciliation quality, alleviating the 
concern that our pre-Reg G results are driven by the quality of excluded items. 
For our cross-Reg G analysis, we model FOI as a linear function of pro forma EPS, 
DIFF, POSTG, and an interaction term between POSTG and DIFF, and we estimate this 
model separately for improvers and non-improvers. If the coefficient on the interaction term is 
insignificant, this would suggest no significant change in the quality of excluded items 
                                                 
15 We also tried future operating cash flows as an alternative dependent variable following Doyle et al. (2003) 
and obtained similar results. 
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subsequent to Reg G and alleviate the concern that our results are attributable to the effect of 
Reg G on the quality of excluded items.  
To maintain consistency with our prior results, we start with the same sample used in 
prior analyses. Specifically, for the pre-Reg G analysis, our initial sample consists of 1,900 
pro forma earnings disclosures; for the cross-Reg G analysis, our initial sample consists of 
1,189 pro forma disclosures, of which 300 observations are associated with non-improvers 
and 889 observations are associated with improvers. We further require future operating 
income for four consecutive quarters after the pro forma disclosure. To avoid the influence of 
outliers, we truncate all continuous variables at the top and bottom one percentile. Our final 
sample consists of 1,616 observations for the pre-Reg G analysis and 1,077 observations for 
the cross-Reg G analysis, of which 281 observations are associated with non-improvers and 
796 are associated with improvers.  
The results are reported in Table 7. To account for time-series and cross-sectional 
dependence in the error terms, the standard errors are clustered by firm and fiscal quarter 
(Petersen, 2009). Panel A reports the results for the pre-Reg G analysis; Panels B and C report 
the cross-Reg G results separately for improvers and non-improvers. As predicted, in all three 
panels, the coefficient on Pro forma EPS is consistently positive while that on DIFF is 
consistently negative. More importantly, we find that the coefficient on the interaction 
between REC DUM and DIFF is not significant (Panel A) and that the coefficients on the 
interaction between POSTG and DIFF are also insignificant for both non-improvers (Panel B) 
and improvers (Panel C). These results suggest no significant change in the quality of 
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excluded items subsequent to Reg G.16 They also suggest no significant change in the quality 
of excluded items between firms with high and low reconciliation quality. These findings 
alleviate the concern that our results are due to the quality of excluded items. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 Reg G requires that companies reconcile non-GAAP earnings with the most 
comparable GAAP earnings number. The SEC argues that such reconciliations should reduce 
the mispricing caused by pro forma earnings.  
We provide three pieces of evidence that are consistent with the notion that 
reconciliations reduce mispricing associated with pro forma earnings. First, using data prior to 
Reg G and controlling for a host of variables that affect firms’ reconciliation quality, we find 
that mispricing exists in firms with low reconciliation quality but not in firms with high 
reconciliation quality. Second, we find no evidence that pro forma earnings are mispriced 
after Reg G. Third, we find that there is reduction of mispricing for firms that improve 
reconciliation quality across Reg G, but there continues to be no mispricing for firms that 
consistently have high reconciliation quality.  
In sum, our results suggest that Reg G has been effective in curbing mispricing, and 
they support the SEC’s claim that reconciliations result in more accurate pricing of securities. 
                                                 
16 Our results are based on a different sample from that used in Kolev et al. (2008). We use pro forma earnings 
from actual press releases, while Kolev et al. (2008) use I/B/E/S actual earnings as a proxy for pro forma 
earnings. Firms with I/B/E/S coverage do not necessarily make pro forma earnings disclosures and conceivably 
they have different characteristics, such as industry membership, institutional ownership, value-relevance of 
GAAP earnings, etc. In addition, our sample requires pro forma earnings disclosures both before and after Reg G, 
while the Kolev et al. (2008) study does not impose this requirement. These sample differences may explain the 
difference in results. 
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Our paper contributes to both the literature on pro forma disclosures and the literature on the 
consequences of securities regulations.   
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Appendix A: Examples of different reconciliation scores 
 
1. Reconciliation Score = 0 
Copyright 1999 PR Newswire Association, Inc.   
PR Newswire 
July 29, 1999, Thursday 
 
HEADLINE:  
Tuesday Morning Corporation Reports Increase in Second Quarter Profits 
 
BODY: 
Tuesday Morning Corporation (Nasdaq: TUES), North America's largest operator of deep-
discount closeout home furnishings and gift stores, today reported a significant improvement 
in its second quarter and first half 1999 operating results. 
 
The Company reported net income of $2.5 million ($0.06 per share) on a proforma basis for 
the quarter ended June 30, 1999, versus a net loss of $0.7 million ($0.02 per share) for 1998. 
Net income for the first half of the year was $3.5 million ($0.09 per share) on a proforma 
basis compared to a net loss of $1.6 million ($0.04 per share) in 1998. Net sales grew 27% 
during the quarter from $84.8 million to $107.7 million and 25% for the first half of the year 
from $143.6 million to $179.4 million. Comparable store sales increased 16.4% for the 
quarter and 15.1% for the year to date. 
… 
 
2. Reconciliation Score = 1 
Copyright 2001 PR Newswire Association, Inc.   
PR Newswire 
October 9, 2001, Tuesday 
 
HEADLINE:  
E-LOAN, Inc. Reports Pro Forma Profitability and Positive Cash-Flow For Third Quarter 
2001; E-LOAN Reports Record Revenues; Achieves Record Mortgage and Home Equity 
Direct Margin; Purchase Mortgage Business Up 65%; Cash Balance Increases to $27.2 
Million 
 
BODY: 
E-LOAN, Inc. (Nasdaq: EELN), (www.eloan.com), a leading online lending company, today 
reported that it achieved pro forma profitability and positive cash-flow from operations for the 
first time in the third quarter ended September 30, 2001.  
 
Revenues for the third quarter of 2001 were $16.9 million, up 88 percent from the $9.0 
million reported in the third quarter of 2000. Pro forma net income for the third quarter of 
2001 was $0.3 million or $0.01 per share on 53.8 million shares, compared with a pro forma 
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net loss of ($8.5) million or ($0.16) per share on 52.9 million shares during the third quarter 
of 2000. These results are $0.06 per share better than the First Call consensus estimate.  
… 
Pro forma results exclude compensation charges related to the company's stock option plan, 
amortization of goodwill on the acquisition of CarFinance.com, and amortization of 
marketing costs related to warrants to purchase the Company's common stock in connection 
with a marketing agreement. The amortization of marketing costs and goodwill concluded in 
the second and third quarters of 2001, respectively. 
…. 
 
3. Reconciliation Score = 2 
Copyright 2001 PR Newswire Association, Inc.   
PR Newswire 
October 25, 2001, Thursday 
 
HEADLINE:  
Allscripts Reports Third Quarter 2001 Results; Software and Service Revenue Increases 30% 
Over Prior Year 
 
BODY: 
Allscripts Healthcare Solutions, Inc. (Nasdaq: MDRX), the leading provider of point-of-care 
decision support tools for physicians, announced today its results for the three and nine month 
periods ended September 30, 2001.  
 
Total revenue for the three months ended September 30, 2001 was $16.4 million. Software 
and related service revenue for the three months ended September 30, 2001 increased by 30% 
from $3.7 million in 2000 to $4.8 million in 2001.  Prepackaged medication revenue increased 
by 5% from $11.1 million in 2000 to $11.6 million in the third quarter of 2001.  
 
The results of operations include a charge of $8.6 million related to a restructuring plan 
announced in July and a non-cash asset impairment charge of $355.0 million related to 
acquired intangible assets and related goodwill. 
 
Pro forma net loss, which excludes the restructuring and asset impairment charges described 
above, as well as amortization of intangibles, net of tax effect, for the third quarter of 2001 
was $11.8 million, or $0.31 per share compared with a pro forma net loss of $5.6 million, or 
$0.19 per share in the same period last year. Net loss for the third quarter was $351.9 million, 
or $9.26 per share, compared with a loss of $15.2 million, or $0.52 per share in the same 
period last year.  
… 
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4. Reconciliation Score = 3 
Copyright 1998 Business Wire, Inc.   
Business Wire 
July 28, 1998, Tuesday 
 
HEADLINE:  
Racing Champions Reports Record 1998 Second Quarter Results 
 
BODY: 
… 
RACING CHAMPIONS CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES 
Consolidated Statements of Income 
(Dollars in thousands, except per share data) 
 
 Three months ended June 30 
 1998 Actual 1998 Pro forma 1997 Actual
 (Unaudited) (Unaudited) (Unaudited)
Net sales                        $ 42,693 $ 42,693 $ 24,950 
Cost of sales                      19,168 19,168 10,628 
Gross profit                       23,525 23,525 14,322 
Selling, general and administrative 
expenses            13,226 13,226 7,274 
Amortization of intangible  assets               669 669 554 
Merger-related costs                5,525 - -
Operating income                    4,105 9,630 6,494 
Interest expense                      743 588 2,142 
Other expense                          39 39 42 
Income before income taxes          3,323 9,003 4,310 
Income tax expense                  1,372 3,644 1,888 
Income from continuing  operations            1,951 5,359 2,422 
Discontinued operations, net of tax benefit 
of $ 266 and $ 428      - - 1,032 
Income before extraordinary item    1,951 5,359 1,390 
Extraordinary charge for early 
extinguishment of debt, net of tax benefit 
of $1,188 
1,782 - -
Net income                       $    169 $   5,359 $  1,390 
EBITDA                            $ 5,545 $ 11,070 $  7,534 
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5. Reconciliation Score = 4 
Copyright 2001 PR Newswire Association, Inc.   
PR Newswire 
July 26, 2001, Thursday 
 
HEADLINE:  
Invitrogen Announces Second Quarter 2001 Results and Executive and Board Changes 
  
BODY: 
… 
 
INVITROGEN CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES  
PRO-FORMA NET INCOME AND EBITDA INFORMATION 
(in thousands, except per share data) (unaudited) 
 
 For the three months ended June 30 
For the six months 
ended June 30 
 2001 2000 2001 2000
Pro-forma Net Income excluding amortization and merger costs, net of tax:   
    Net income (Loss)   $ (35,098) $ 4,826 $ 74,663 $ 2,959 
     
Add back amortization and merger costs           
 71,220 205 147,603 6,686 
Less related tax benefit     
 (10,586) (161) (23,383) (325)
Pro-forma Net Income  $ 25,536 $ 4,870 $ 49,557 $ 9,320 
Pro-forma earnings per share:     
          Basic $ 0.49 $ 0.21 $ 0.95 $ 0.40 
          Diluted $ 0.47 $ 0.19 $ 0.92 $ 0.37 
Weighted average shares used in pro-forma diluted earnings per share calculation       
 53,812 25,282 53,756 25,365 
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Appendix B: Variable definitions 
 
Variables  Measurement 
EMPHASIS  1 if pro forma earnings are mentioned prior to GAAP earnings in the press release, 0 otherwise. 
PRLOSS  Number of consecutive quarters of losses over the eight quarters prior to the quarter examined. 
STDROA  The standard deviation of ROA (earnings divided by the beginning-of-year total assets) over the prior eight quarters. 
HITECH  1 if the firm is in the high-tech industry as defined by Francis and Schipper (1999), 0 otherwise. 
LOSS  1 if GAAP earnings are less than zero, 0 otherwise. 
REVERSELOSS  1 if pro forma earnings are greater than zero but GAAP earnings are less than zero, 0 otherwise. 
REVERSEMIS  1 if pro forma earnings meet or beat the analyst forecast but GAAP earnings miss the analyst forecast, 0 otherwise.  
NUMEST  Number of analysts that follow the firm in the month before the earnings announcement. 
INSTOWN 
 
Percentage of total shares owned by institutional investors as reported by the 
Spectrum database for the calendar quarter closest to the earnings announcement 
date. 
LOGASSETS  Natural log of total assets. 
LOGMEDCOV 
 
Natural log of the number of articles in which the firm is mentioned in the 
headline or lead paragraph in the Wall Street Journal, USA Today, New York 
Times, Time, BusinessWeek, Newsweek, Fortune, and Forbes in the previous 
calendar year.  
DIFF  Pro forma earnings per share minus GAAP earnings per share deflated by total assets per share.  
ABSDIFF  Absolute value of DIFF. 
LOGTOTALNUM  Natural log of total number of adjustments made between GAAP earnings and pro forma earnings. 
DEPRAMORT  Indicator variable for depreciation and amortization costs (excluding amortization of stock-based compensation, intangibles, and goodwill). 
INTANGAMORT  Indicator variable for amortization of intangibles and goodwill. 
STOCKCOMP  Indicator variable for stock compensation costs. 
MERGE  Indicator variable for merger and acquisition costs. 
R&D  Indicator variable for research and development (R&D) costs and write-offs of in-process R&D costs. 
GAINLOSS  Indicator variable for gains and losses on sales of various assets. 
EXTRADISC  Indicator variable for extraordinary items and discontinued operations. 
SHARES  Indicator variable for adjustment to the number of shares used in the denominator of the EPS calculation. 
RESTRUCT  Indicator variable for restructuring charges. 
IMPAIR  Indicator variable for write-offs due to asset impairment (including goodwill impairment). 
OTHER  Indicator variable for all other adjustments. 
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Appendix C: The simultaneous equation system  
 
The firm’s reconciliation decision may be affected by the firm’s emphasis decision 
(i.e., the decision to emphasize GAAP or pro forma earnings), while the firm’s emphasis 
decision may in turn be affected by the firm’s reconciliation decision. To deal with the 
endogeneity issue, we build a simultaneous equation system, which consists of two 
equations.17 One equation explains the firm’s reconciliation decisions and includes variables 
discussed in Section 3.1. The other equation explains the firm’s emphasis decision and, 
following Bowen et al. (2005), includes the value-relevance of GAAP earnings, managerial 
incentives, investor sophistication, media coverage, excluded expenses, and reconciliation 
quality as independent variables.  
The residual reconciliation quality is the residual from the equation where 
reconciliation quality is the dependent variable. It is orthogonal to all the independent 
variables and essentially measures reconciliation quality after controlling for its various 
determinants. Our simultaneous equation system is as follows:  
LOGRECONCILE =  α0+ α1EMPHASIS+ α2PRLOSS+ α3 STDROA+ α4HITECH 
 + α5LOSS+ α6REVERSELOSS+ α7REVERSEMIS+ α8NUMEST 
 + α9INSTOWN+ α10LOGASSETS+ α11ABSDIFF+ α12LOGTOTALNUM 
 +Σ δk TYPE(k) + ε                 
               (1) 
 
EMPHASIS =  β0+ β1LOGRECONCILE+ β2PRLOSS+ β3STDROA + β4HITECH 
 + β5REVERSELOSS+ β6REVERSEMIS + β7NUMEST+ β8INSTOWN 
 + β9LOGMEDCOV+ β10DIFF+ µ                                                         (2) 
 
where 
 
LOGRECONCILE is the logged value of one plus the raw reconciliation quality score; 
                                                 
17 Given this endogeneity issue, an OLS regression will yield biased coefficient estimates.  
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EMPHASIS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if pro forma earnings are mentioned prior to 
GAAP earnings in the press release, 0 otherwise; 
PRLOSS (the frequency of prior losses), STDROA (earnings variability), HITECH 
(membership in a high-tech industry), and LOSS (current losses) are four measures of 
the value-relevance of GAAP earnings; 
REVERSELOSS and REVERSEMIS are proxies for managerial incentives to report 
positive earnings and beat analysts’ forecasts, respectively;  
NUMEST (the number of analysts that follow the firm) and INSTOWN (the percentage 
ownership of institutional investors) are proxies for investor sophistication;  
LOGASSETS is the natural log of total assets; 
LOGMEDCOV (media coverage) is the natural log of the number of articles in the 
mainstream media that mentioned the firm in the headline or lead paragraph in the 
previous calendar year; 
DIFF is pro forma earnings per share minus GAAP earnings per share deflated by total 
assets per share, and ABSDIFF is the absolute value of DIFF; 
LOGTOTALNUM is the natural log of the total number of adjustments made between 
GAAP earnings and pro forma earnings; and 
TYPE (k) refers to the dummies representing pro forma adjustment types. There are 11 
dummies: DEPRAMORT, INTANGAMORT, STOCKCOMP, MERGE, R&D, 
GAINLOSS, EXTRADISC, SHARES, RESTRUCT, IMPAIR, and OTHERS.  
Appendix B provides more detailed variable definitions.  
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Figure 1 
Distribution of reconciliation quality for the sample of 2,934 pre-Reg G pro forma press 
releases from 1998-2001 
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a Reconciliation scores are defined as follows: 
 
0 –No disclosure of account names or magnitudes 
1 –Disclosure of account names only 
2 –Disclosure of both account names and magnitudes 
3 –Provision of both GAAP income statement and pro forma income statement 
4 –Provision of a reconciliation table between GAAP and pro forma earnings 
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Table 1 
Distribution of 2,934 pre-Reg G pro forma press releases by year, stock exchange, and 
industry from 1998-2001 
 
Panel A: Distribution of pro forma earnings releases by year 
Year # of Press Releases % of Sample Mean Reconciliation Score 
1998 282 9.61% 2.23 
1999 274 9.34% 2.41 
2000 755 25.73% 2.48 
2001 1,623 55.52% 2.38 
Total 2,934 100% 2.39 
 
 
Panel B: Distribution of pro forma earnings releases by stock exchange 
Exchange # of Press Releases 
Mean 
Reconciliation 
Score 
% of Sample % of CRSP Firms 
NYSE 429 2.45 14.62 31.11% 
AMEX 28 2.64 0.95 9.74% 
NASDAQ 2,477 2.38 84.42 59.15% 
Total 2,934 2.39 100% 100% 
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Panel C: Distribution of pro forma earnings releases by industry 
Industry # of Press Releases 
Mean 
Score 
% of 
Sample 
% of 
Compustat 
Firms 
Business Services 1308 2.35 44.58% 13.41% 
Computers 784 2.52 26.72% 9.12% 
Retail 114 2.18 3.89% 4.20% 
Pharmaceutical Products 75 2.16 2.56% 4.78% 
Wholesale 54 2.39 1.84% 3.28% 
Measuring and Control Equipment 51 2.16 1.74% 1.86% 
Machinery 49 2.35 1.67% 2.76% 
Communication 44 2.20 1.50% 3.83% 
Other 41 2.54 1.40% 2.51% 
Medical Equipment 33 2.12 1.12% 2.86% 
Personal Services 29 2.34 0.99% 0.97% 
Trading 28 2.82 0.95% 4.50% 
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 26 2.35 0.89% 1.81% 
Electrical Equipment 25 2.48 0.85% 1.23% 
Printing and Publishing 21 2.48 0.72% 0.75% 
Construction Materials 21 2.62 0.72% 1.50% 
Construction 20 2.20 0.68% 1.14% 
Chemicals 17 2.00 0.58% 1.47% 
Transportation 16 2.38 0.55% 2.03% 
Banking 14 2.00 0.48% 9.76% 
Healthcare 13 2.23 0.44% 1.47% 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 13 2.15 0.44% 3.32% 
Entertainment 12 3.08 0.41% 1.77% 
Apparel 12 2.75 0.41% 1.13% 
Insurance 12 2.00 0.41% 2.66% 
Consumer Goods 10 2.50 0.34% 1.49% 
Business Supplies 10 2.40 0.34% 1.07% 
Agriculture 9 2.33 0.31% 0.26% 
Food Products 9 2.67 0.31% 1.29% 
Recreation 9 2.33 0.31% 0.86% 
Steel Works, Etc. 9 2.89 0.31% 1.25% 
Utilities 7 2.71 0.24% 2.80% 
Real Estate 7 2.43 0.24% 0.96% 
Beer and Liquor 5 3.00 0.17% 0.32% 
Rubber and Plastic Products 5 2.20 0.17% 0.85% 
Automobiles and Trucks 5 2.00 0.17% 1.20% 
Electronic Equipment 5 3.00 0.17% 0.27% 
Textiles 3 3.67 0.10% 0.45% 
Candy and Soda 2 2.00 0.07% 0.24% 
Fabricated Products 2 4.00 0.07% 0.34% 
Tobacco Products 1 2.00 0.03% 0.11% 
Aircraft 1 2.00 0.03% 0.32% 
Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 1 3.00 0.03% 0.50% 
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Coal 1 1.00 0.03% 0.07% 
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 1 1.00 0.03% 0.27% 
Shipping Containers 0 - 0.00% 0.16% 
Defense 0 - 0.00% 0.12% 
Precious Metals 0 - 0.00% 0.70% 
Total 2,934 2.39 100% 100% 
High-Technology (High-tech) Firms 1,734 2.42 59.10% 25.75% 
Intangible-Intensive Firms 1,979 2.38 67.45% 28.99% 
 
The sample consists of 2,934 pro forma press releases from 1998-2001. Individual industries are as defined in 
Fama and French (1997). High-tech firms are as defined in Francis and Schipper (1999). Intangible intensive 
firms are as defined in Collins et al. (1997).  
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Table 2  
 
Descriptive statistics  
 
Variables Mean Std. Dev Q1 Median Q3 
Panel A: Pro forma adjustment categories 
DEPRAMORT 0.089 0.286 0.000 0.000 0.000 
INTANGAMORT 0.463 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 
STOCKCOMP 0.371 0.483 0.000 0.000 1.000 
MERGE 0.247 0.431 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R&D 0.156 0.363 0.000 0.000 0.000 
GAINLOSS 0.136 0.343 0.000 0.000 0.000 
EXTRADISC 0.051 0.219 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SHARES 0.071 0.256 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RESTRUCT 0.165 0.371 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IMPAIR 0.087 0.282 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OTHERS 0.445 0.497 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Panel B: Other variables 
PRLOSS  1.917 1.833 0.000 1.000 4.000 
STDROA  0.091 0.188 0.017 0.036 0.089 
HITECH  0.631 0.483 0.000 1.000 1.000 
LOSS 0.665 0.472 0.000 1.000 1.000 
EMPHASIS 0.815 0.388 1.000 1.000 1.000 
REVERSELOSS  0.225 0.418 0.000 0.000 0.000 
REVERSEMIS  0.581 0.494 0.000 1.000 1.000 
NUMEST  7.226 6.548 3.000 5.000 9.000 
INSTOWN  0.424 0.246 0.215 0.392 0.634 
LOGASSETS 5.809 1.514 4.698 5.521 6.730 
DIFF 0.056 0.230 0.005 0.017 0.045 
ABSDIFF 0.061 0.229 0.007 0.019 0.047 
LOGTOTALNUM 0.752 0.577 0.000 0.693 1.099 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample of 1,900 pro forma press releases from 1998-2001, with 
all the variables non-missing in the reconciliation determinant model as specified in Section 3.1. Panel A reports 
descriptive statistics for the pro forma adjustment categories. Panel B provides descriptive statistics for the other 
variables. Appendix B provides detailed variable definitions.  
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Table 3  
Determinants of Reconciliation Quality 
 
  Logged Reconciliation Scores 
  (LOGRECONCILE) 
Independent Variables Predicted  Sign Coefficient t-value 
Intercept  0.999* 19.41 
PRLOSS  + -0.001 -0.21 
STDROA  + 0.062** 2.26 
HITECH  + 0.027*** 1.94 
LOSS + -0.056** -2.04 
EMPHASIS  0.063** 2.34 
REVERSELOSS   0.048* 3.35 
REVERSEMIS   0.010 1.36 
NUMEST  + 0.000 -0.04 
INSTOWN  + -0.038 -1.28 
LOGASSETS + 0.023* 3.82 
ABSDIFF + 0.002 0.09 
LOGTOTALNUM + 0.079* 4.79 
DEPRAMAORT  -0.030 -1.31 
INTANGAMORT  0.041* 3.65 
STOCKCOMP  -0.060* -4.98 
MERGE  -0.012 -0.98 
R&D  0.037* 3.79 
GAINLOSS  -0.021 -0.94 
EXTRADISC  -0.002 -0.05 
SHARES  -0.178* -3.85 
RESTRUCT  -0.029*** -1.95 
IMPAIR  0.061** 2.43 
OTHERS  -0.025** -2.55 
N  1900  
Adjusted-R2   11.41%  
 
This table reports the coefficient estimates and t-statistics from estimating the determinant model of 
reconciliation quality. T-statistics are computed using standard errors clustered by firm and fiscal quarter. The 
sample consists of 1,900 pro forma press releases from 1998-2001 with all the variables that are non-missing. 
LOGRECONCILE is the logged value of one plus the raw reconciliation score. Raw reconciliation scores range 
from the lowest quality reconciliations (score=0) to the highest quality reconciliations (score=4). Details on the 
reconciliation scores are reported in Figure 1.  Independent variables are defined in Appendix B. One, two, and 
three asterisks indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.  
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Table 4 
 
Calendar-time Fama-French three-factor regression results for observations prior to Reg G 
 
 
Rpt is the equally weighted return of the portfolio of firms in calendar month t; Rmt is the return on the value-
weighted index of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks in month t; Rft is the one month Treasury bill rate in 
month t; SMBt is the return on small firms minus the return on large firms in month t; and HMLt is the return on 
high book-to-market stocks minus the return on low book-to-market stocks in month t (Fama and French, 1993). 
The sample consists of 1,900 press releases from 1998-2001 with sufficient data to estimate the residual 
reconciliation quality. We first form two equal-sized groups based on the median of residual reconciliation 
qualities obtained from the reconciliation quality equation in Table 3, with the low (high) group consisting of 
observations with the value below (above) the median. Within each reconciliation quality group, we form three 
terciles each month based on DIFF and construct an arbitrage portfolio by buying stocks in the low DIFF 
portfolio and shorting stocks in the high DIFF portfolio, with all portfolios being held for one year. DIFF is 
computed as pro forma earnings per share minus GAAP earnings per share deflated by total assets per share. 
Panel A (Panel B) reports portfolio analysis results within the low (high) residual reconciliation quality group. 
The table reports coefficient estimates, with t-statistics in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.  
Panel A: Results of time-series three-factor regression analysis within the low residual reconciliation 
quality group 
 a b s h  Adjusted- 
R2 
Low DIFF  0.004*** 
(1.71) 
1.424* 
(5.93) 
0.662* 
(2.83) 
-0.594*** 
(-1.96) 
 68.3% 
High DIFF -0.006** 
(-2.67) 
1.464* 
(7.04) 
0.549* 
(2.71) 
-0.586** 
(-2.23) 
 73.6% 
Arbitrage portfolio  
(Low DIFF minus High DIFF)  
0.010* 
(4.18) 
-0.040 
(-0.17) 
0.113 
(0.50) 
-0.008 
(-0.03) 
 -4.83% 
Panel B:  Results of time-series three-factor regression analysis within the high residual reconciliation 
quality group 
 a b s h  Adjusted- 
R2 
Low DIFF  0.003 
(0.18) 
1.787* 
(5.46) 
0.736** 
(2.35) 
-0.503 
(-1.23) 
 60.8% 
High DIFF 0.010 
(1.00) 
1.865* 
(8.40) 
0.730* 
(3.44) 
-0.450 
(-1.62) 
 77.9% 
Arbitrage portfolio  
(Low DIFF minus High DIFF) 
-0.007 
(-0.56) 
-0.078 
(-0.27) 
0.006 
(0.02) 
-0.053 
(-0.15) 
 -5.51% 
tthHMLtsSMBftRmtRbaftRptR ε+++−+=− ][
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Table 5 
 
Calendar-time Fama-French three-factor regression results for observations after Reg G 
 
 
 
 
Rpt is the equally weighted return of the portfolio of firms in calendar month t; Rmt is the return on the value-
weighted index of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks in month t; Rft is the one-month Treasury bill rate in 
month t; SMBt is the return on small firms minus the return on large firms in month t; and HMLt is the return on 
high book-to-market stocks minus the return on low book-to-market stocks in month t (Fama and French, 1993). 
The sample consists of 1,295 press releases between April 2003 and December 2004, a period during which Reg 
G was effective. Each month, we form three terciles based on DIFF and construct an arbitrage portfolio by 
buying stocks in the low DIFF portfolio and shorting stocks in the high DIFF portfolio, with all portfolios being 
held for one year. DIFF is computed as pro forma earnings per share minus GAAP earnings per share deflated 
by total assets per share. The table reports coefficient estimates, with t-statistics in parentheses. One, two, and 
three asterisks indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.  
 a b s h  Adjusted- 
R2 
Low DIFF  -0.008 
(-0.50) 
1.843* 
(5.59) 
0.688** 
(2.15) 
-0.567 
(-1.36) 
 61.1% 
High DIFF -0.007 
(-0.73) 
1.788* 
(8.77) 
0.744* 
(3.75) 
-0.473*** 
(-1.83) 
 79.5% 
Arbitrage portfolio  
(Low DIFF minus High DIFF) 
-0.001 
(-0.06) 
0.055 
(0.19) 
-0.056 
(-0.20) 
-0.094 
(-0.26) 
 -5.07% 
tthHMLtsSMBftRmtRbaftRptR ε+++−+=− ][
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Table 6 
 
Calendar-time Fama-French three-factor regression results for cross-Reg G analysis 
 
Panel A: Results of time-series three-factor regression analysis for non-improvers 
 a d b s h Adjusted 
-R2 
(1) Low DIFF  0.002 0.008 1.771* 1.020* -0.336 55.7% 
 (0.12) (0.34) (6.26) (3.66) (-0.95)  
(2) High DIFF -0.002 0.001 1.607* 0.645* 0.172 48.7% 
 (-0.22) (0.05) (6.89) (2.81) (0.59)  
(3) Arbitrage portfolio  0.004 0.007 0.164 0.376 -0.509 10.8% 
(Low DIFF minus High 
DIFF)  
(0.32) (0.32) (0.63) (1.46) (-1.55)  
Panel B: Results of time-series three-factor regression analysis for improvers 
 a d b s h Adjusted 
-R2 
(4) Low DIFF  -0.002 -0.013 1.672* 0.583* -0.633** 67.7% 
 (-0.16) (-0.72) (8.04) (2.85) (-2.42)  
(5) High DIFF -0.020* 0.018 1.803* 0.429* -0.701* 82.8% 
 (-2.88) (1.50) (12.74) (3.08) (-3.94)  
(6) Arbitrage portfolio  0.018** -0.031** -0.130 0.154 0.068 2.8% 
(Low DIFF minus High 
DIFF) 
(2.28) (-2.21) (-0.80) (0.95) (0.33)  
        
p-value (two-tailed) from testing  d in (3)= d in (6) 0.06  
p-value (two-tailed) from testing  a+d=0 in (3) 0.55 
p-value (two-tailed) from testing  a+d=0 in (6) 0.28  
 
Rpt is the equally weighted return of the portfolio of firms in calendar month t; Rmt is the return on the value-
weighted index of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks in month t; Rft is the one month Treasury bill rate in 
month t; SMBt is the return on small firms minus the return on large firms in month t; and HMLt is the return on 
high book-to-market stocks minus the return on low book-to-market stocks in month t (Fama and French, 1993). 
The full sample consists of 1,189 firm-quarter observations from 1998-2004, of which 300 observations are 
associated with 51 non-improvers and 889 observations are associated with 144 improvers. Non-improvers are 
firms whose reconciliation quality is consistently high across Reg G, while improvers are firms whose 
reconciliation quality improves across Reg G. Within improvers and non-improvers, we form two equal-sized 
portfolios each month based on DIFF and construct an arbitrage portfolio by buying stocks in the low DIFF 
portfolio and shorting stocks in the high DIFF portfolio, with all portfolios being held for one year. DIFF is 
computed as pro forma earnings per share minus GAAP earnings per share deflated by total assets per share. The 
high (low) DIFF portfolio consists of stocks with DIFF higher (lower) than the median. POSTG is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the current month t is after Reg G, and 0 otherwise. Panel A (Panel B) reports 
tthHMLtsSMBftRmtRbdPOSTGaftRptR ε+++−++=− ][
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the regression results related to non-improvers (improvers). The table reports coefficient estimates, with t-
statistics in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 7 
Regression of future operating income on pro forma EPS and exclusions  
 
Panel A: Regression analysis for Pre-Reg G sample (Number of obs. = 1616, adjusted-R2  = 37.2%) 
Future Operating Income=a+ b*Pro forma EPS + c*DIFF + d*REC DUM + e*REC DUM*DIFF+ ε 
 a b c d e 
Predicted sign  + -   
Coefficient estimate -0.072 2.729* -0.365 -0.004 0.075 
t-statistics (-7.27) (12.56) (-1.54) (-0.35) (0.34) 
Panel B: Regression analysis for non-improvers (Number of obs. = 281, adjusted-R2  = 44.9%) 
Future Operating Income=a+ b*Pro forma EPS + c*DIFF + d*POSTG + e*POSTG*DIFF + ε 
 a b c d e 
Predicted sign  + -   
Coefficient estimate -0.034* 2.673* -0.236 0.035* 0.186 
t-statistics (-3.04) (7.55) (-1.36) (2.65) (0.71) 
Panel C: Regression analysis for improvers (Number of obs. = 796, adjusted-R2  = 42.1%) 
Future Operating Income=a+ b*Pro forma EPS + c*DIFF + d*POSTG + e*POSTG*DIFF + ε 
 a b c d e 
Predicted sign  + -   
Coefficient estimate -0.081* 2.997* -0.208 0.084* 0.006 
t-statistics (-4.89) (11.19) (-1.35) (4.64) (0.04) 
 
This table examines whether the quality of excluded items and the quality of reconciliation are correlated. Panel 
A performs analysis using our pre-Reg G sample from 1998-2001, and Panels B and C perform analysis using 
our cross-Reg G sample from 1998-2004. Our final sample consists of 1,616 observations for the pre-Reg G 
analysis (Panel A) and 1077 observations for the cross-Reg G analysis, of which 281 observations are associated 
with non-improvers (Panel B) and 796 are associated with improvers (Panel C).  Non-improvers (Panel B) are 
firms whose reconciliation quality is consistently high across Reg G, while improvers (Panel C) are firms whose 
reconciliation quality improves across Reg G. Future Operating Income is the operating income per share (#177) 
summed over the four quarters starting with quarter q+1, scaled by assets per share (#44 / #15). Pro forma EPS 
is pro forma earnings per share in the press release for quarter q, scaled by assets per share. DIFF is pro forma 
earnings minus GAAP earnings per share, scaled by assets per share. REC DUM is coded as 1 if the 
reconciliation is of low quality (i.e., the residual reconciliation score is below the median), and 0 otherwise. The 
residual reconciliation score is obtained from the reconciliation quality equation in Table 3. POSTG is coded as 1 
if the observation is after Reg G, and 0 otherwise. T-statistics reported in parentheses are computed using 
standard errors clustered by firm and fiscal quarter. One, two, and three asterisks indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.  
 
 
 
